On the other hand, numerous authors have suggested that it is the political grievances of the parties, and not economic greed, that is the root cause and driving motivation of violence. Disagreements over issues such as identity, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or social class are the ultimate causes and drivers of violence see also Azar , 29; Burton b, Others still suggest that greed versus grievance is a false debate. Nevertheless, the debate demonstrates the extent to which understandings of the causes of violence play a role in how conflict resolution is approached.
Even those who are altogether 2Not all agree, however. A second feature that plays out in narratives of conflicts is the demonization and vilification of belligerents. It is common in violent political conflicts for each side to demonize the other in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of their adversary's positions and aims while elevating the legitimacy of their own.
Villifying rhetoric frames the cause of the conflict as the particular attributes and 'evil' of an adversary and establishes a 'good' versus 'evil' account where one side of the war is dehumanized and perceived as illogical and barbaric Mazurana , As explored below, the process of vilification can impinge on the possibility of a negotiated settlement.
How might the ICC affect the dominant narrative of a conflict and, more specifically, understandings of the causes and dynamics of violence? First, the ICC is likely to bolster a 'good' versus 'evil' account of the conflict in which it intervenes. This is not to say that the ICC itself creates 'good' versus 'evil' narratives. As a familiar feature of violent conflict, such a framing of a conflict will likely pre- date any ICC intervention.
After all, few things are more effective at demonizing a party to a conflict than accusations that they have committed the most egregious violations against 'humanity' — war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Importantly, once an arrest warrant has been issued, the warrant and its effects on stigmatizing the indicted party are likely to be permanent. In the case of an ICC-indictee, a warrant is 'live' until the individual is either tried or deceased.
Indictees may thus carry their stigma indefinitely. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ICC functions to individualize guilt and responsibility for the crimes under its jurisdiction. A by-product of pursuing individual responsibility for atrocities is the ascription of responsibility of a conflict to specific actors. For the ICC, social and socio-economic causes and dynamics are irrelevant. After all, only individuals can end up in the dock at The Hague.
Thus, where the ICC intervenes, we should expect to see those individuals it investigates and indicts take a prominent, even dominant, role in the narrative of the conflict. The individual perpetrators wanted by the ICC, in this context, may be seen as the very cause of the conflict itself. Bringing such individuals to justice, then, is likely to be identified as a form of conflict resolution in and of itself.
This certainly has been the case with Joseph Kony, Omar al-Bashir and Muammar Gaddafi, figures who have assumed 'larger-than- life' roles during the wars in northern Uganda, Darfur, and Libya, respectively. Their stigmatization has inspired and entrenched views that resolving the wars necessitates their 'removal'. Third, the ICC is a fundamentally dynamics-focused institution; it is largely irrelevant why crimes were committed and the political context in which atrocities occur is not intended to have any bearing on the Court's investigations or prosecutions.
In July charges of genocide were added. As noted in Chapter 2, his stigmatization has not prevented him from traveling on diplomatic missions, including to ICC member-states. This has been a point of contention for some observers. Importantly, the neglect of a conflict's causes, as well as some of its dynamics, is likely to be exacerbated in cases where the Court intervenes in conflicts whose roots lie beyond the jurisdictional reach of the ICC. The Court has a limited temporal jurisdiction and can only investigate atrocities which occur after 1 July Moreover, the Court's temporal jurisdiction can be restricted by the UN Security Council when it refers a situation to the Court, as it did in the case of Libya see Chapters 6 and 8.
The effects of a tribunal's temporal jurisdiction on a conflict are important. The decision to intervene in conflicts whose causes precede the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC may affect who is investigated and prosecuted.
Moreover, the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC may also obfuscate the role and responsibility of other actors in contributing to or even creating the conditions under which atrocities occur. As a result, the Tribunal has been unable to investigate the role of Belgian and French forces in fostering the conditions for the genocide Lanegran , as well as allegations that, in the aftermath of the Genocide, the Rwandan 4 Interestingly, however, there have been calls to address economic greed within the ICC.
See, for example, Clarke The Attitudes and Incentives of Warring Parties The attitudes and incentives of parties towards committing to a peace process are determined by whether the parties believe that their interests are better served by engaging in peace talks or by continuing to fight. The decision-making of the warring parties in this context will ultimately shape and determine the potential for a peace process to begin — and potentially succeed.
At the core of all of these motivations is a desire of the parties to retain or rescue their sense of legitimacy. It should come as no surprise that the framing of a conflict as good-versus-evil can shape the attitudes and incentives of parties towards peace talks.
Spector , argued that demonization raises the costs of negotiation by giving the decision to negotiate the appearance of appeasement and any negotiator the potential label of hypocrites and collaborators in evil. Moreover, One of the major consequences of villainization is the closing off of the negotiation option and the peaceful settlement of disputes Demonization may thus have the effect of reducing the space for peaceful approaches to conflict resolution by raising the costs of negotiations.
But I also think that from long experience that can complicate a resolution of a difficult, complex situation because it limits options to persuade leaders perhaps to step down from power. None of this is to say that negotiations with 'villains' cannot occur.
Without this prenegotiation decision, real negotiation will never occur. The colouring of a conflict as 'good' and 'evil' has consequently created opportunities for parties to reject negotiating with an opponent on the basis of its perceived 'evil', a label often constructed and reproduced by the very same party that is unwilling to negotiate. In other words, a 'good' versus 'evil' narrative of the conflict can be 'tapped into' in order to justify the positions and decisions of the warring parties towards negotiations.
It's the only way to deal with them. The decision of parties to negotiate with 'evil' thus presents a baseline moral dilemma for the field of conflict resolution and one whose stakes may be raised by ICC interventions. It is important to also consider the attitudes and incentives of actors who may not be direct participants in the conflict but play a role in fuelling the war. Ensuring the right parties play a productive role in the peace process is a critical task See Zartman , This requires having an understanding of the drivers of conflict, some of which may be beyond the boundaries of the state or conflict theatre.
In particular, it is not unusual for regional or neighbouring powers to have active interests in conflicts Giessman and Wils , ICC investigations and arrest warrants may have numerous and diverse effects on the attitudes and incentives of conflict parties as well as their patrons.
Firstly, individuals targeted by the ICC may respond to the Court's intervention violently. As outlined in Chapter 2, critics of international criminal justice's role in ongoing conflicts suggest that the ICC's targets will lose any incentives to peacefully resolve the conflict and will lash out. This is, for example, one way to interpret Bashir's expulsion of humanitarian groups from Darfur in the wake of his indictment by the ICC in However, violent responses may also be the result of an indicted individual being humiliated by the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Emotions such as humiliation and embarrassment may result from investigations and indictments and subsequently impact the party's behaviour and attitudes towards peace. David Keen , 50 has argued that humiliation can contribute to the ongoing production of violence see also Gilligan ; In such cases, we may see actors entrench 5 It should be noted that the US, under Barack Obama, subsequently engaged in negotiations with the Taliban see, e.
Crucially, however, attributing continued or escalated violence directly to the ICC requires evidence that the violence is linked to the Court's intervention and decision-making and not to other factors in the conflict. Continued violence may be a result of actors being 'locked-in' to a logic of violence or other factors, such as a military intervention by external parties. It may not be the target s of the ICC who respond to the Court's intervention by renewing their commitment to violence.
In cases where an ICC intervention is aimed only or primarily at one side of the conflict, such as in Uganda or Libya, the Court will shape and reaffirm a narrative of the conflict that ultimately benefits one side of the war, painting them as the legitimate and 'good' side by virtue of not being indicted. In contrast, the indicted party becomes 'criminal' and 'evil'. Non-targeted parties may believe that the Court's intervention signals a shift in the international community's perception of the conflict in their favour, bolstering their position in the war.
In this way, the ICC's intervention may be seen not as a means to investigate a situation, but a way to investigate a particular party or group of adversaries. This is a widely held misconception. The non-targeted party may also tap into the 'good' versus 'evil framing of the conflict in order to justify their recalcitrance or refusal to explore a negotiated settlement.
The non-indicted party may thus argue that it cannot negotiate with 'evil' or with 'criminals' and 'terrorists'. Notably, a refusal to negotiate with individuals wanted by the ICC fits with the Court's view that certain actors, namely those wanted on allegations of international crimes, are not, and can never be, legitimate negotiation partners.
But it is important not to discount the possibility that neither party responds violently to an ICC intervention. Some indicted actors may attempt to rescue the sense of legitimacy they perceive as being threatened by the Court. This is most likely to be true for non-state actors such as rebel groups who do not otherwise have significant means to communicate with the outside world see Giessman and Wils , Engaging in the peace process may thus lend a degree of legitimacy to the indicted party.
This may be more likely to be the case when only one side in the conflict is targeted by the ICC. Here, the indicted party may seek to use the peace process as a vehicle to communicate what they see as a more fair and accurate understanding of the conflict wherein both sides are seen as responsible for violence and human rights abuses. An intervention by the ICC may also affect the perceived in security of a targeted party. The ICC, in this context, may be seen as a direct threat to the viability of the targeted group and their security, particularly if they lose the support of external groups.
Still, this does not necessarily mean that the targeted group will respond violently. Rather, they may take a defensive approach and even enter peace negotiations in order to bide their time. If insecurity and fear for safety is caused by the ICC's intervention, it is likely that the targeted group will seek guarantees against prosecution as a precondition to entering peace negotiations see the case of the LRA in Chapter 4.
The attitudes and incentives of indicted parties may also be affected by the response of external parties and patrons with interests in the conflict to an ICC intervention.
The Court's interventions may create an important disincentive for conflict patrons to continue supporting — financially or otherwise — the investigated or indicted party, particularly where international scrutiny and the possibility of sanctions is high.
This, in turn, may affect the indicted party's interest in entering negotiations. An indicted party may seek to fill the vacuum left by a departed patron by exploring the benefits of entering negotiations or by engaging in peace talks in order to 'buy time' to find new sources of support. Insofar as this weakens the indicted party, this too may have implications on the party's willingness to enter the peace process.
Additionally, there is a danger in ascribing defections in the midst of conflict directly to the ICC whilst other factors, including the level of violence, sanctions and offers from third parties, may be as, if not more, influential.
Nevertheless, if indicted individuals are isolated internally or externally as a direct or indirect result of the ICC, this gives some credence to the claims that the ICC can marginalize and isolate indicted individuals. Lastly, it is important to consider the possibility that the ICC does not affect the attitudes and incentives of actors targeted by the ICC in any measurable way.
In such cases, there may be more pressing issues at hand, such as an intense period of warfare or an ongoing international military intervention which threatens the very survival of the indicted party. In such cases, we might expect that little attention is paid to the dropping of ICC warrants in relation to the dropping of bombs.
The ICC and Peace Processes The overarching narrative of a conflict and the attitudes and incentives of warring parties to enter peace talks are key factors which determine whether and how a potential peace process is initiated. Both of these interrelated sfactors filter through and affect the subsequent phases, issues and dynamics of a peace process.
This section 'explodes' peace processes into their constituent phases, issues and dynamics and suggests how the ICC can affect each. Peace processes generally consist of at least three phases: a pre-negotiation phase, a negotiation phase, and a post-negotiation phase. Each of these stages is made up of additional issues and dynamics. This is not to suggest that all peace processes will pass through all three phases or that they will do so similarly. Some efforts to resolve and transform conflict may fail before they reach the negotiation phase.
Others may fail during negotiations, resulting in a return to violence or a new round of mediated talks, while others still may fail in the post-negotiation phase as parties de-rail the implementation of peace agreements.
It should also be noted that the phases in a peace process — and the issues and dynamics within them — cannot be neatly packaged Zartman , It may not always be clear where one phase ends and another begins — or vice versa. Issues and dynamics that affect one phase will often leak into and shape subsequent stages. In short, the packaging of a peace process into neatly delineated phases belies the complexity and dynamism of conflict resolution, where phases often blur and blend rather than begin and end.
While it is essential to recognize this reality, the framework nevertheless treats the phases under consideration as analytically distinct. Parsing them out provides a useful way to examine how international criminal justice affects the unique issues and dynamics within each stage of a peace process. Getting to the Table: The Pre-Negotiation Phase Studies of the pre-negotiation phase of peace talks are ultimately concerned with the distinct dynamics and decisions which affect the willingness of parties to 'get to the table'.
It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations In essential terms, prenegotiation is the span of time and activity in which the parties move from conflicting unilateral solutions for a mutual problem to a joint search for cooperative multilateral or joint solutions Where pre-negotiations fail to move the peace process towards official negotiations, the parties will likely return to using violence as the dominant expression of conflict until the military victory of one party over the other or the onset of a renewed round of pre-negotiations.
At least three issues are of critical importance in the negotiation phase: the timing of the negotiations, the decision of where to hold peace talks, and the mediation strategies employed to get parties to the negotiation table.
Faced with a decision to either continue fighting a war they cannot win and which is incurring high costs on the belligerents and few benefits, the parties will decide that an alternative approach to resolving the conflict is desirable.
Ripeness thus pertains to both the ideal timing as well the right conditions for peace talks Fisher , In short, a mutually hurting stalemate is a necessary if insufficient condition for a shift in strategic thinking away from attempting to achieve military victory towards a consideration of resolving the conflict via peace negotiations.
Some have criticized or attempted to reformulate Zartman's ripeness theory. In short, timing matters. Not all moments in a conflict are best or ideal for mediation and negotiation. The questions with regards to the ICC's effects are rather simple: does the Court's involvement affect the emergence of conditions which lead to peace negotiations at a particular time and, if so, how?
First, the ICC may inhibit a mutually hurting stalemate from arising. It may, as many suggest see, e. The non-targeted party may thus read the investigation or indictment of its adversary as a legitimization of its own position and its use of violence and consequently refuse to enter into any process which reconceives their adversary as a legitimate negotiation partner. In such instances we might expect the emergence of a ripe moment for negotiations to be frustrated by the ICC's intervention in favour of the non-targeted party committing to continued violence.
This is true even if the ICC-targeted adversary is prepared to negotiate. This may occur directly or indirectly. Mediterranean Politics is a new yearbook providing a major new perspective on European Union events, contemporary trends, and developments in the region during the previous year. The Nature of Future Conflict.
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